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Managers face a critical issue in deciding when to employ a predictive planning approach
versus a more adaptive and flexible strategic approach. We suggest that determining which
approach is ideal for a given context hangs on the extent to which uncertainty is, or might
be, mitigable within that context. To date, however, the mitigability of uncertainty has not
been adequately distilled. Here, we take on this issue, distinguishing mitigable ignorance of pertinent but knowable information (i.e., “epistemic uncertainty”) from immitigable indeterminacy (i.e., “aleatory uncertainty”). We review the current state of
the debate on the existence of free will, because the acceptance or rejection of conscious
agents as a true first cause has fundamental implications. A critical examination of the
arguments for and against the free will hypothesis land us on the side of voluntarism,
which implies immitigable indeterminacy (but not complete unpredictability) wherever conscious actors are involved. Accepting the existence of immitigable or aleatory
uncertainty, then, we revisit the determination of strategic logics and produce important theoretical nuance and key boundary conditions in the normative choice between
predictive and nonpredictive strategies.

“Natural science does not render the future predictable. It makes it possible to foretell the results to be
obtained by definite actions. But it leaves unpredictable two spheres: that of insufficiently known natural
phenomena and that of human acts of choice.”

& Kapsa, 2010; Chwolka & Raith, 2012; Reymen,
Andries, Berends, Mauer, Stephan, & Van Burg,
2015). The meta-theoretic assumptions underlying
this view suppose uncertainty to be mitigable, and
that information-gathering efforts can reduce uncertainty sufficiently to facilitate prediction and
planning. The boundary between prediction and
planning versus nonprediction and adaptation, then,
concerns the magnitude or extent of uncertainty—
when uncertainty is sufficiently strong that the costs
of necessary information gathering outweigh the
benefits of its alleviation, a nonpredictive or effectual approach may be preferable (Wiltbank, Dew,
Read, & Sarasvathy, 2006).
However, uncertainty theorists have yet to carefully examine the nature of, and possible differences
in, uncertainty’s mitigability. It is not altogether clear
that all uncertainty is, or may be, mitigable, and some
uncertainties may be more mitigable than others.
For example, Alvarez and Barney (2005) implied
that Knightian risk is mitigable, whereas Knightian
uncertainty is not (Wiltbank et al., 2006)—a topic
on which Knight (1921) himself was somewhat unclear. Most, however, apparently presume that all

(Mises, 1998: 105)

When should managers and entrepreneurs forecast and plan, and when should they adopt a more
dynamic, adaptive strategy? So far, there has been a
“disturbing inconclusiveness of the empirical research on the relationship between planning and
market performance” (Chwolka & Raith, 2012: 387).
Present sentiment holds that planning and adaptation ought to be integrative or concomitant, and that
the extent of planning versus dynamic adaptation
ought to depend on the amount of uncertainty surrounding the firm or venture (Brinckmann, Grichnik,
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uncertainty is mitigable in principle, and that firms
with the most and best information, and, thus, least
uncertainty, in aggregate possess the advantage (see
Townsend, Hunt, McMullen, & Sarasvathy, 2018, for
a review). Uncertainty, then, is commonly understood to exist on a continuum, from weak to strong,
with no apparent fundamental delineation regarding
the nature of the underlying uncertainties that epitomize the “strength” or “degree” (or mitigability) of
the presently instantiated uncertainty (Dequech,
2011). As a result, arguments advocating a turn toward more dynamic or nonpredictive decision logics
(e.g., Packard, Clark, & Klein, 2017; Perry, Chandler,
& Markova, 2012; Sarasvathy, 2001) so far remain
theoretically incomplete, as they lack sufficient
boundary conditions to delineate under what uncertainty conditions such strategies would be preferable over more traditional strategic planning
approaches (Arend, Sarooghi, & Burkemper, 2015;
but see Gupta, Chiles, & McMullen, 2016; Read,
Sarasvathy, Dew, & Wiltbank, 2016). For example,
when does uncertainty become too strong to effectively manage via information management and
analysis, thereby compelling a dynamic uncertainty
navigation approach? When is uncertainty able to be
sufficiently assuaged so as to facilitate effective
management through prediction, or when is it so
strong as to practically disallow such prediction and,
therefore, require more adaptive strategic management? Or, when do the costs of uncertainty’s mitigation surpass the strategic benefits of a predictive
strategy compared to an adaptive one? The roots of
this issue are not only in what and how much is uncertain, but also in the nature of that uncertainty and
the extent to which it is, or may be, mitigable.
In this article, we examine the theoretical and
philosophical roots and sources of “mitigable” versus
“immitigable” uncertainty and elaborate on the strategic importance of mitigability within the context
of managerial decision-making (e.g., when nonpredictive strategies would be normatively preferable over predictive strategies). We find theoretical
grounding for this project in probability theory, which
has distinguished uncertainty derived from ignorance
of knowable information (i.e., “epistemic uncertainty”) from that derived from inherently stochastic
events (i.e., “aleatory uncertainty”) (Der Kiureghian &
Ditlevsen, 2009; Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Hacking,
1975; Perlman & McCann, 1996; Tannenbaum, Fox, &
Ülkümen, 2017). The difference between these epistemic and aleatory uncertainty concepts, however, is
not altogether clear, and hangs in large part on larger
questions and assumptions. Specifically, does true

767

stochasticity exist, or is perceived randomness simply
ignorance (i.e., epistemic uncertainty) of the underlying causal inputs to an outcome? Ultimately, this
drives us to important philosophical questions concerning mental causation and the existence and nature of free will. We carefully explore the current state
of science regarding these questions and conclude
that we cannot yet—and, thus, should not—reject
the free will hypothesis. Adopting this position here,
the effective actions of conscious actors are, to us,
inherently and immitigably uncertain (although not
always or entirely unpredictable). As a result, in the
vast majority of relevant cases, decision-makers are
confronted with situations comprising both mitigable
(epistemic) and immitigable (aleatory) uncertainty
types.
The implications of this delineation for management are profound, touching virtually all areas
of management interest, from entrepreneurship and
strategic management to organizational behavior
and human resource management. In particular, we
show how the (im)mitigability of uncertainty provides a critical boundary condition for strategic
decision-making (see Tsoukas, 1996), and argue that
the perceived nature of the various uncertainties
one faces will (and ought to) dictate which type of
strategic logic one pursues (see also Wiltbank et al.,
2006). A strategy of concomitant predictive and nonpredictive logics is not enough; the strategist must
also understand which uncertainties require which
logics and when a shift in logics is in order. We also
offer, in conclusion, a cursory look at some additional
implications of a truly immitigable uncertainty concept, corresponding to the notions of free will and indeterminism, for management research while leaving
the bulk of such implications to future research.
ON THE (IM)MITIGABILITY OF UNCERTAINTY
One of the primary goals of strategic management
and entrepreneurship, and the strategic tools that
have been developed therein, is to facilitate more
successful management of the uncertainty that managers and entrepreneurs face with regard to future
demand (Anupindi & Jiang, 2008; Goyal & Netessine,
2007), competition and competitive action (Grimm,
Lee, Smith, & Smith, 2006; Milliken, 1987), institutional and regulatory change (Bylund & McCaffrey,
2017; Smith & Grimm, 1987), factor markets (Walker &
Weber, 1987; Williamson, 1975), and so on. However, there are two dominant strategies that pertain
to uncertainty management. The first seeks competitive advantage through uncertainty mitigation and

768

Academy of Management Review

planning-based strategic management. The second
pursues success and sustainability through adaptability and agility.
Uncertainty management through mitigation has
been the prevailing paradigm for several decades. It
has roots in Taylor’s (1914) scientific management. It
was prevalent in Thompson’s (1967) classic work,
and is a foundational tenet of resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), which argues that
firms can manage uncertain environments via control over key resources and through the formation of
interorganizational relationships (Hillman, Withers,
& Collins, 2009). According to the resource-based
view, information and knowledge are key resources
that bestow advantages in strategically dealing with
uncertainty (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984)—which
is also the basis of a knowledge-based view (Felin &
Hesterly, 2007; Grant, 1996; Spender, 2003). Uncertainty mitigation is one of the foundational motivations
for the organizational learning and absorptive capacity
literatures (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Cohen & Levinthal,
1990; Kraatz, 1998; March, 1991; Siegenthaler, 1997;
Sinkula, 1994), which see knowledge advantages as
bestowing predictive superiority, and, thus, greater
strategic and innovative success. In short, this perspective sees information as the remedy to uncertainty,
and so strategic advantage via uncertainty mitigation is
conferred upon those who are most adept at finding,
absorbing, controlling, and utilizing information (Klir,
2006).
The second uncertainty management strategy involves coping with and, perhaps, capitalizing on
uncertainty, rather than attempting to mitigate it.
This alternative view was highlighted in Burns and
Stalker’s (1961) early contingency theoretic work,
which argued that organizations in contexts of high
uncertainty might better manage that uncertainty
through organic structural organization rather than
mechanistic designs (see also Ouchi, 1977, 1979, 1980).
It was developed in Ackoff and Emery’s “systems
thinking” approach to management (Ackoff, 1983;
Ackoff & Emery, 1972). The importance of adaptability within uncertain environments was prominent in Mintzberg’s (1973, 1978; Mintzberg &
McHugh, 1985; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret,
1976) theorizing on strategy formation. It is also a
central theme of the dynamic capabilities literature
(Schilke, 2014; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), real
options (McGrath, Ferrier, & Mendelow, 2004), and
strategic effectuation (Wiltbank et al., 2006). In short,
this view holds that uncertainty is, often, best
addressed through its effective navigation rather than
its mitigation—for example, strategically organizing
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for rapid informational processing and response rather
than superior knowledge acquisition and exploitation.
The tension between these literatures is often overlooked, perhaps because they are seen as addressing
the same issue. Certainly, it need not be the case that
firms focus exclusively on uncertainty mitigation or its
navigation. Whereas the ideal organizational form and
function for uncertainty mitigation is understood to be
much different from that of an adaptive approach,
some have advocated more fluid structures that are
able to toggle between both strategic approaches
(Brinckmann et al., 2010; Chwolka & Raith, 2012;
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013; Reymen et al., 2015).
However, such strategic dualism can be costly, difficult, and often ineffective under more radical types of
uncertainty (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Such ineffectiveness is, likely, due to ambiguities in determining
if and when one or another approach is preferable (a
gap we seek to address). It behooves us, then, to more
thoroughly distil the boundary conditions by which a
particular strategic decision approach is, or ought to be,
determined. To answer this, we must better understand the distinct natures of the uncertainty that they
seek to address.
Wiltbank and colleagues (2006), in line with the
work of Shackle (1949, 1979, 2009) and others
(e.g., Buchanan & Vanberg, 1991; Lachmann, 1977,
1986), distinguished two types of uncertainty: the
“unknown” and the “unknowable”—or, in our terminology, the “mitigable” and the “immitigable.”
Their treatment of these, however, is brief and inadequate to establishing a well-formed boundary.
We therefore expound on these two types in the following sections.
Epistemic (Mitigable) Uncertainty
Epistemic uncertainty originates from ignorance
of knowable information (Der Kiureghian & Ditlevsen,
2009; Perlman & McCann, 1996; Tannenbaum et al.,
2017). In a Newtonian sense, all outcomes are presumed to be knowable ex ante as long as all causal
factors and their effects are known a priori. Probabilities are merely shorthand for ignorance of certain
underlying criteria needed to perfectly predict an
outcome. For example, a coin flip would become
perfectly predictable if all the variables by which it is
flipped (angle, velocity, spin rate, air friction, angle
and hardness of the landing surface, etc.) could
be fully accounted for and their effects fully understood. Thus, epistemic uncertainty concerns various
“knowledge problems” (Townsend et al., 2018:
659), including causal ignorance and ambiguity,
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equivocality, probabilistic risk (Knight, 1921), as well
as what Dosi and Egidi (1991: 148) dubbed “weak
substantive uncertainty,” which derives from a “lack
of information about the occurrence of a particular
event within a known list of events, in principle representable as a random drawing by ‘nature,’ with a
certain known (or at least knowable) probability
distribution.”
Epistemic uncertainty also reflects Dosi and Egidi’s
(1991: 146) notion of “procedural uncertainty,” which
derives from “a competence gap in problem-solving,”
or a computational incapacity to fully process available information into a known, consequential outcome. Perlman and McCann (1996: 17) depicted
epistemic uncertainty in this way, defining it as “uncertainty existing because the mind . . . cannot apprehend more than a limited sphere.”
Here, we define epistemic uncertainty in terms
of its mitigability—that is, uncertainty is, for us,
“epistemic” if it results from ignorance of knowledge
that is knowable in principle. This includes those
uncertainties for which the information or computational capacity needed to mitigate them may not yet
be available. That we cannot, as of yet, always and
precisely predict changes in weather and climate
does not mean that they are wholly unpredictable—
prediction should, in fact, become possible if and
once we have determined and can precisely measure
all relevant factors, their weights, and interactions.
The Sources of Epistemic Uncertainty
Following early pioneers of the environmental
uncertainty construct, we observe three primary
sources of epistemic uncertainty: complexity, dynamism, and stochasticity (Child, 1972; Dess &
Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972; North, 2005). “Complexity” reflects the total amount of data or “the level
of complex knowledge that understanding the environment requires” (Sharfman & Dean, 1991: 683).
“Dynamism” refers to the rate at which such causal
factors within an environment change. “Stochasticity”
(or “nonergodicity”) refers to the nonrepetitiveness or
randomness of change in an environment such that a
pattern cannot be detected and, hence, next-states
predicted (Davidson, 1991). Individually and conjointly, these factors inhibit predictability inasmuch as
the actor or the computational system tasked with information processing cannot sufficiently observe or
manage the amount of observable data required to
predict next-state outcomes.
Once the capacity or speed limits of procedural
rationality—the total computational power that one
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possesses or has access to in order to assess and analyze observational data—are surpassed, a decisionmaker cannot calculate certainly the next-state
outcome (Simon, 1979). Partial ignorance of the
complete immediate state of possibly relevant factors,
or a procedural incapacity to calculate their effects,
forces the mind to deal with consequential ambiguity. Within such ambiguity, one must instead imagine expected outcomes through mental play-outs of
possibilities (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991; Shackle, 1949, 1969). Inasmuch as the
decision-maker recognizes these computational limitations and admits alternative outcome possibilities,
they experience epistemic uncertainty.
In conclusion, the delineation between Knightian
risk and uncertainty and the corresponding planning
versus strategic adaptation decision logics (e.g.,
Alvarez & Barney, 2005) is incomplete. While risk
is, inherently, mitigable, much of Knightian uncertainty (or what is often described as such) is too.
Thus, planning scenarios may be preferable within
certain uncertainty conditions, if those conditions
can be sufficiently and easily mitigated.
Aleatory (Immitigable) Uncertainty
While much of uncertainty is epistemic and, thus,
mitigable, it is not clear whether all of it is, or may be,
or whether some of what is uncertain is absolutely
beyond knowability, even in principle, such that it is
altogether immitigable. In this section, we explore
the possibility of causal indeterminacy and the aleatory uncertainty that would result.
The term “aleatory” derives from the Latin alea,
meaning the rolling of dice. It has been employed
in probability theory to model uncertain contexts
in which intrinsic randomness is observed (Der
Kiureghian & Ditlevsen, 2009; Hacking, 1975). More
recently, the term “aleatory uncertainty” has been
used to describe decisions in which indeterminate
and unknowable factors produce a situation that is
perceived to be stochastic (Fox & Ülkümen, 2011;
Perlman & McCann, 1996). It is, according to
Perlman and McCann (1996: 17), “a factual uncertainty,” ontologically real where, in a Newtonian
sense, at least one underlying causal factor is utterly
unknowable, even in principle (see Dequech, 2004).
This relates to Dosi and Egidi’s (1991: 148) notion of
“strong substantive uncertainty,” which involves
“the impossibility, even in principle, of defining the
probability distribution of the events themselves.”
Whether an outcome is truly random in a probabilistic
sense, or if its determination is utterly unknowable,
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may be pertinent to the decision-making process,
although standard decision theories generally treat
the two scenarios as equivalent (e.g., Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Savage, 1954). In the former case, the
possible outcomes are known, but their likelihoods
cannot be. In the latter, the outcomes themselves are
unknown and unknowable, the set of outcomes unbounded or indeterminate (Packard et al., 2017). Both
cases, however, are aleatoric or result in “aleatory
uncertainty.”
For us, aleatory uncertainty is characterized by its
immitigability. It is uncertainty not characterized by
ignorance of knowable information, but by immitigable ignorance. It is a knowledge problem produced
by some inherent, a priori causal indeterminism that
cannot be mitigated, even in principle.
Is there any such ignorance—and, thus, uncertainty—
that is altogether immitigable? If so, what information
is unknowable? This is a philosophic question, and
one in respect of which scholars disagree. Here following, we briefly review the debate in order to assess
whether aleatory uncertainty ought to be understood
as objectively real, or whether its effects are only
meaningful through its subjective perception (as in
Tannenbaum et al., 2017).
The Free Will Debate
A primary possible source of indeterminism is
human choice. To what extent are human actors
predictable, or to what extent could they be? Certainly, we often feel like we can predict people,
especially those we know well. In a general or aggregate sense, we are often right in our predictions of
behavior. However, it seems possible for a person,
even one we know very well, to act in a way that is
wholly unpredictable a priori. For example, while a
parent might be so familiar with their child’s goals
and preferences and have well-formed beliefs regarding the child’s future behaviors, and although
such beliefs often turn out to be quite accurate, parents will attest to their children’s continued abilities
to surprise them.
While there is general agreement that humans are
at least difficult, if not impossible to predict (Popper
& Eccles, 1977; Scriven, 1965), there is less clarity
among opinions of why this is the case. Are human
actors a source of mitigable (epistemic) uncertainty
that can become fully predictable once all the pertinent data can be observed and processed? Or, is
the exercise of human agency a source of immitigable (aleatory) uncertainty, incapable of being fully
predicted?
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The theoretical possibility of perfectly predicting
human action—that is, of fully mitigating behavioral
uncertainty—rests on our assumptions concerning
free will. By “free will,” we mean “the thesis that we
are sometimes in the following position with respect
to a contemplated future act: we simultaneously
have both the following abilities: the ability to perform that act and the ability to refrain from performing
that act” (van Inwagen, 2008: 329). The question of
free will concerns:
. . . whether there is anything left over by these conditions of our existence such that our free actions can
be said to be (i) our products (i.e., caused by us) and
such that (ii) their occurring rather than not occurring
here and now, or vice versa, has as its ultimate or final
explanation the fact that they are caused by us. (Kane,
1989: 224, emphasis in original)

This question adopts a “counterfactual” account of
causality (Lukka, 2014), which holds that “an event
Y depends causally on a distinct event X if and only if
both X and Y occur, and if X had not occurred, then Y
would not have occurred either” (Lewis, 1973: 9).
That is, the free will question asks if intentional action cannot happen except with, through, or because
of the conscious will. This is not to say that human
reflex cannot happen without the will, but instinctive or reflexive behaviors are of a different category
than conscious or intentional behaviors (Mises,
1998).
The concept of free will has been of central concern within philosophy, its implications quite strong
with regard to how we understand and study people.
Yet, little real progress has been made in understanding mental causation. This is not to say that
important work has not been done on the topic—on
the contrary, modern arguments for and against the
existence of free will have become advanced and
refined (e.g., Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008;
Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert,
2016; Nahmias, 2014; Nichols, 2011; Searle, 2015).
However, despite this progress, we remain in the
same state as we did centuries ago—we do not know.
Some believe that the question of free and conscious
will, which has roots in the mind–body problem (i.e.,
the question of where consciousness and mental
causation comes from), may be unsolvable (see
Chalmers, 1996; McGinn, 1989).
On the one hand, many hold that behavior is fully
caused, and that improvements in observation,
measurement, and data processing will improve the
prediction of human behavior up to and, at least in
principle, including to the point where perfect data
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would yield perfect prediction. This “determinist”
position on the question of free will is, succinctly,
that it does not exist, and that the sense that one experiences of the ability to choose is, in fact, illusory
(Wegner, 2003). This view has been buoyed by experiments in neuroscience and psychology. For example, Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983)
found that preparatory cognitive activity precedes
one’s awareness of any intention to act, which has
been taken by determinists as evidence that intentions to act are an epiphenomenon, outside of the
causal chain of action (see Figure 1). Langer (1975)
found that, in circumstances of pure chance, individuals often feel as if they have some control over
the outcome. This illusion of control is, for determinism, an aspect of the illusion of free will, an illusion that is important to one’s self-concept and
psychological well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Researchers have also observed a “blindsight” phenomenon (Becker, Cropanzano, & Sanfey, 2011;
Humphrey, 1974), whereby participants react to
stimuli that they had no apparent conscious awareness of (e.g., Leh, Johansen-Berg, & Ptito, 2006).
Wegner (2003; 2004: 649) concluded that “the experience of consciously willing an action and the
causation of the action by the person’s conscious
mind . . . are entirely distinct, and the tendency to
confuse them is the source of the illusion of conscious will.” This perception of free will may have
evolved within us to ensure cooperative and ethical
behavior (see Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall,
2009; Clark, Luguri, Ditto, Knobe, Shariff, &
Baumeister, 2014; Krueger, Hoffman, Walter, &
Grafman, 2013; Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014;
Pereboom, 2001; Stillman, Baumeister, & Mele,
2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008).
On the other hand, “voluntarism” holds that free
will is a real phenomenon and a true causal
originator—an “uncaused cause” (Shackle, 1983).
According to voluntarism, behavior cannot be reduced to purely circumstantial causes. There is a
factor of conscious intentionality or agency—of free

will—in human action (Mises, 1998). Like determinism, voluntarism accepts the trans-temporality
thesis that the state of the world at one time is causally related to the state of the world at another time,
otherwise we would not act (Finch, 2013; Mises,
1962). It rejects, however, the Kantian dictum that
“everything has a cause,” supposing there to be an
Aristotelian “first cause” in the conscious mind, that
free will cannot be reduced to purely physical causes
such that what we might call the “self” can be removed
from predictive models of behavior (see Figure 2). In
other words, it rejects determinism’s conclusion that the
state of the world at one time fully determines the next
state of the world, given the immutable laws of nature.
There is some debate and, sometimes, misunderstanding with regard to the extent of mental causation. For example, if an instructor asks a question
and a student raises their hand to answer, we might
say that the question “caused” them to raise their
hand—that is, the question indicated that a response
was desired, prompting the student to mentally derive an answer to the question, which was then
judged with respect to the worthiness of the answer,
the worthiness itself inducing the student to choose
to share it, which, in turn, elicited the raising of the
hand. To what extent was their will a factor in this
process? The answer is, in short, we do not know.
The voluntarist position is, in contrast to that of the
determinist, that it is more than nothing.
A third camp—the “compatibilist” view—
contends that free will exists, but is caused (Hume,
2003). Just as it is acceptable and even correct to say a

FIGURE 1
The Determinist View of Free Will and Choice
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FIGURE 2
The Voluntarist View of Free Will and Choice
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wing causes flight, even though a “wing” is just a
concept representing the matter arranged in a particular configuration that makes it up, the will is
caused by underlying factors (Nahmias, 2014)—a
caused cause. For example, Searle (1980, 2015)
proposed that consciousness and free will emerge
from the complex organization of the brain. While
compatibilism is attractive, its viability rests on
redefining fundamental terms in such a way as to
allow compatibility. As per the so-called “consequence argument” (van Inwagen 1983), the concept
of “free will” as meant by determinists and voluntarists cannot allow reconciliation between the two
positions—either free will is a true first cause, or
choices are fully attributable to causal factors other
than free will (Finch, 2013; van Inwagen, 2008).
Ever-increasing empirical evidence of behavioral
determinants can be interpreted as suggestive that,
eventually, human behavior will become predictable and, thus, an epistemic uncertainty problem
(Harris, 2012; Wegner, 2003). However, Nahmias
(2014) pointed out that determinism’s epiphenomenalist conclusion that the neural correlates of intentionality are bypassed in the causal sequence of
events, thereby producing a merely illusory experience of free will, rests on three assumptions, none of
which are currently supported by the evidence.
First, it assumes that we can identify the nonconscious neural activity that precedes conscious
awareness as the true source of intentionality. Neuroscientific research continues to be unable to ascertain the origins of neural activity and so cannot
place its origins within nonconscious sources. It is
certainly plausible, for example, that willful intentions initiate a neurological sequence of customary
or pre-planned behaviors—“scripts,” in the language
of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984)—that are
then monitored by the will as events and behaviors
unfold to ensure that desired outcomes result, or, if
not, recalibrate and modify the course of action toward the intended end or, otherwise, revise the intentions sought. Such an alternative explanation
allows for brain processes to be caused by the will
while also preceding what has so far been described
as conscious awareness, which awareness may quite
possibly be mere urges rather than irrevocable
intentions or decisions to act (Mele, 2009). Or, alternatively, Schurger, Sitt, and Dehaene (2012) proposed that the observed neuronal activity widely
understood as “readiness potential” that precedes
conscious willing to act (Libet et al., 1983) may instead be a separate judgment to determine when to
make an action judgment (e.g., when there is enough
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information, or when the actor is ready). In other
words, what scientists previously thought determined conscious action before one’s recognition of
having made the decision to act may actually be
one’s decision to make a decision and, thus, correspond appropriately with one’s temporal perception
of willing.
Second, it assumes that such intentionality in
fact causally bypasses the will rather than operating
through it. Additional experiments performed by Libet
(1999) and colleagues suggest that the observed mental preparation to act—the urge to act in a particular
way—can be consciously “vetoed,” preventing the action, which would suggest that the process operates
through the conscious will and not around it.
Finally, it assumes that we can accurately identify
participants’ reports of conscious awareness of the urge
to act at a certain time with the actual decision to act at
that time. However, neuroscientific research suggests
that the temporal perception of conscious awareness is
not straightforward. For example, in one experiment,
participants perceived voluntary actions as occurring
later, and their sensory outcomes earlier, than they
actually were, whereas, for perceived involuntary actions, the effect was the opposite (Haggard, Clark, &
Kalogeras, 2002). Evidence suggesting that the experience of free will occurs after intentions to act are already instigated is not at all surprising or contradictory
to the voluntarist position, as “the sensation of will isn’t
the will itself any more than the sensation of hunger is
the same thing as being devoid of nutrients, or the
sensation of warmth is heat itself, or the smell of a rose
is the rose itself” (Hardcastle, 2004: 662; Heyman,
2004; Jack & Robbins, 2004).
We are far from being in a position, as a science, to
simply dismiss free will as a causal factor of behavior. In this state, then, we conclude that the appropriate, pragmatic assumption must be voluntarism.
As Mises (1998: 18) postulated:
We may or may not believe that the natural sciences
will succeed one day in explaining the production of
definite ideas, judgments of value, and actions in the
same way in which they explain the production of a
chemical compound as the necessary and unavoidable outcome of a certain combination of elements. In
the meantime we are bound to acquiesce in a methodological dualism.
Human action is one of the agencies bringing about
change. . . . As—at least under present conditions—it
cannot be traced back to its causes, it must be considered as an ultimate given and must be studied as
such.

2020

Packard and Clark

Voluntarism is the more defensible “default” position for management science, for several reasons. First,
while the source of mental causation (i.e., conscious
will) remains unobservable, its unobservability is insufficient to justify assuming nonexistence (Godfrey &
Hill, 1995; Hayek, 1989). Second, social and human
sciences generally deal with large amounts of unexplained variance. Dismissing this variance as noise is
less tenable, we think, than attributing some, if not
much, of it to free will (see Howard & Conway, 1986;
Miller & Atencio, 2008). Finally, research strongly
suggests that promotion of free will is ethically preferable to an advocacy of determinism. Because a belief
in determinism facilitates counterproductive and unethical behavior (Baumeister et al., 2009; Krueger
et al., 2013; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), we are ethically
obliged to avoid jumping to such conclusions absent
incontrovertible evidence.
Human action is, as far as science has so far
allowed us to determine, an originator of causation, a
creator, an uncaused or first cause (Joas, 1996;
Shackle, 1979). Thus, the practical course is to treat
human action as inherently uncertain, an uncertainty that cannot be mitigated to the extent that free
will has causal influence over outcomes. As more
conscious actors come to have potential influence
over any particular outcome of interest, that outcome
becomes increasingly and immitigably uncertain.
Other Sources of Aleatory Uncertainty
Even if we were to determine free will to be an illusion, however, there may be other possible sources of
aleatory uncertainty that might render human action
and other causal factors altogether unknowable. We
briefly acknowledge two here. First is the unknowability of what is it like to have conscious experience.
This “what is it like” problem of subjective experience
has been put forward by philosophers as a critical
boundary of epistemology (Jackson, 1982, 1986). For
example, Nagel (1974) famously observed that some
knowledge is altogether beyond science’s reach, such
as the experience of being a bat. We may know about
bats, their blindness, echolocation, their biology, and
so forth, but we can never know what it is like to be one.
At best, we can only imagine or mimic the experience
from our own viewpoint—that is, “What it would be
like for me to behave as a bat behaves?”—but we cannot know “what it is like for a bat to be a bat” (Nagel,
1974: 439). Thus, “qualia”—the conscious experiences
of what things feel like from the first-person
perspective—involve more than what a purely physical observation or explanation can produce.
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The unknowability of qualia presents an irresolvable hurdle that also leads to aleatory uncertainty. For
example, if the outcome of interest is, specifically,
another’s experience, such an outcome would be, to
some extent, beyond knowability. While others’ experiences are not typically of direct interest to the
decision-maker, who is generally more concerned
about others’ behaviors and the ability to predict them,
direct, first-hand experiences—the qualia of such
experiences—contain the interpretive lens through
which learning occurs. Thus, individual knowledge
and understanding, which are (or may be) scientifically unknowable, are employed directly in determining behavior. Thus, the “what it’s like” problem
itself creates aleatory uncertainty regarding human
behavior, even in the absence of free will.
Secondly, physicists have run into significant
knowability problems at the quantum level. For example, whereas quantum particles (e.g., electrons)
normally exhibit a waveform pattern, the mere observance of some particle collapses its wave function and
produces a single-stream pattern instead. Attempts to
explain such results have led to a variety of interpretations. The popular Copenhagen interpretation posits
quantum “indeterminism,” suggesting that the quantum world is merely probabilistic, and, therefore, only
semi-predictable (Bell, 1964; Einstein, Podolsky, &
Rosen, 1935; Gröblacher et al., 2007). Heisenberg’s
uncertainty or indeterminacy principle posits that the
position and the velocity of a quantum object cannot
both be measured simultaneously and exactly, even in
theory. Quantum theory, which has strong support of
experimental evidence, suggests that there may be
aspects of aleatory and immitigable uncertainty even
within the physical realm. While the relevance of such
physical indeterminism to the realm of management
science, for now, appears to be limited, it illustrates
that aleatory uncertainty is, or may be, real and relevant far beyond what has hitherto been recognized.
The Boundaries of Uncertainty’s Mitigability
The total uncertainty of an environment or outcome comprises all indeterminacy or unknowability
(i.e., aleatory uncertainty) as well as all observational
and procedural limits to prediction (i.e., epistemic
uncertainty), as depicted in Figure 3. Epistemic uncertainty, as we have defined it, is mitigable, whereas
aleatory uncertainty is not. Thus, total uncertainty is
mitigable to the extent that the epistemic component
can be eliminated through increases in information
and in cognitive awareness and capacity—for example, through technological advancements by
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FIGURE 3
The Limits of Uncertainty’s Mitigability
Total Uncertainty
Boundary of indeterminism/
mitigability
Epistemic Uncertainty
Complexity/Dynamism/Stochasticity (+)

Aleatory Uncertainty
Human influence over outcomes (+)

Knowledge/Computative capacity (–)

which cognitive awareness and computational capabilities may be supplemented. This uncertainty
mitigation is bounded, however at the upper limit of
aleatory indeterminism—where aleatory uncertainty
exists, it bounds uncertainty’s mitigation to some real
and significant limit.
Of note, the acceptance of aleatory uncertainty
within a system implies that causal closure is impossible. “Causal closure” refers to the bounding of
causal influence to a limited number of known factors, whereas an open system can be influenced by
unknown “outside” factors. “Physical causal closure” refers to a state in which all outcomes have
only physical, and thus knowable, causes (Papineau,
2009). Free will disallows physical causal closure, as
it must always be “outside” of the known causal
factors within a system.
Proposition 1. Outcomes within a system characterized by physical causal closure and, thus, epistemic
uncertainty are, in principle, fully predictable.
Proposition 2a. There can be no causal closure where
human actors are involved. Behavioral uncertainty is,
at most, only partially mitigable. There will always be
some aspect of human choice that is immitigably
uncertain.
Proposition 2b. The level of aleatory (immitigable)
uncertainty increases correspondingly to the extent
that free will is a causal factor of an outcome. The
more influence an actor has on an outcome, and the
more actors that have an influence on an outcome, the
more immitigably uncertain that outcome will be.

THE BOUNDARIES OF
(NON)PREDICTIVE STRATEGY
Having laid out the arguments for a delineation
between mitigable epistemic uncertainty and immitigable aleatory uncertainty, we turn to the question of

how this distinction might causally influence
decision-making and successful strategy. Is one decision process superior to another within epistemic
versus aleatory uncertainty? Specifically, we are
interested in whether and when predictive and
planning strategies are preferable to nonpredictive
approaches. For simplicity, we focus our attention
on effectuation theory, as it has already cleanly delineated predictive (i.e., causal) and nonpredictive
(i.e., effectual) logics, and because there is a highly
relevant and ongoing conversation about the appropriateness of its boundary conditions and their
ties to uncertainty concepts (Arend, Sarooghi, &
Burkemper, 2016; Gupta et al., 2016; Read et al.,
2016). However, these implications are, or ought to
be, equally relevant for other strategic judgment
approaches, such as real options (McGrath, 2001;
McGrath et al., 2004) and heuristics-based management (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Maitland &
Sammartino, 2015).
Before determining the boundary conditions that
normatively delineate a predictive versus nonpredictive strategy, we must first lay out the primary
differences in these strategies, including and especially their distinct costs and benefits. By “nonpredictive strategy,” we do not mean that there is no
prediction or judgment whatsoever, for all action
requires such—we would not act if there were no
expectation of some preferred outcome as a result of
that action (Mises, 1998). The delineation between
predictive and nonpredictive strategy, then, is centered on the “incrementalism” of the firm’s (or entrepreneur’s) predictions—a nonpredictive strategy
is high in incrementalism, preferring smaller judgments at shorter intervals, and regularly revisiting
and revising those judgments based on new information learned in that short span (Packard et al.,
2017). A predictive strategy instead attempts to make
longer-term predictions of future outcomes so as to
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plan and coordinate the firm’s actions to most optimally take advantage of the predicted future state
(Wiltbank et al., 2006). Thus, due to smaller commitments per decision and shorter prediction
time horizons, the potential for prediction error is
smaller under a nonpredictive strategy, but the costs
(broadly speaking) of such a strategy tend to be
higher, requiring constant environmental scanning,
information absorption, and plan revision. Strategic
planning, in contrast, mitigates many of these costs
by facilitating efficient and optimized preparations
early, but these cost savings are accompanied by a
much higher risk of predictive error and, thus,
failure.
The basic premise of effectuation theory is that,
under conditions of Knightian uncertainty and resource constraints, experienced and successful entrepreneurs tend toward “effectual” rather than
“causal” decision logic (Sarasvathy, 2001). An effectual approach to entrepreneurship advocates that
the entrepreneur “begin with a given set of means,
focus on affordable loss [i.e., what they can afford to
lose], emphasize strategic alliances, exploit contingencies, and seek to control an unpredictable future”; a causal approach would instead “begin with a
given goal, focus on expected returns, emphasize
competitive analyses, exploit preexisting knowledge, and try to predict an uncertain future” (Perry
et al., 2012: 839). Thus, causation is predictive while
effectuation is nonpredictive in nature. Theorists
have described the logic underlying effectuation as
one of “control” in that, “to the extent that we can
control the future, we do not need to predict it”
(Sarasvathy, 2001: 252). However, we observe that
control is only possible with causal closure. Effectual
entrepreneurs, thus, do not control the future in a
literal sense, their goal attainment dependent upon
uncontrollable market actors; instead, what effectuation theorists mean by this is a “focus on the controllable aspects of an unpredictable future”
(Sarasvathy, 2001: 252) to maximize the chances of a
preferred outcome. Thus, strictly speaking, effectuation’s nonpredictive logic is, as we have described,
a predictive incrementalism.
Effectuation theory posits two essential boundary
conditions under which a nonpredictive or effectual
learning approach would be strategically preferable
to a predictive or causal planning approach: (1)
Knightian uncertainty and (2) resource constraints
bounded by the commitments of stakeholders within
their “affordable loss” (Arend et al., 2015; Sarasvathy
& Dew, 2005). However, these conditions do not
appear sufficient to necessarily imply a preference
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for an effectuation approach. Thus, effectuation
theory has been criticized (Arend et al., 2015: 640;
Welter, Mauer, & Wuebker, 2016) for having:
. . . no precise competitive landscape (complete with
dependent variable specification) from which to
compare alternative processes to determine which is
best under which conditions; without this, there is no
reason for a practitioner to use an effectual process
rather than a different process.

That is, there seems to be no clear guidance or instruction for when effectuation procedures would be
preferable to causal decision processes, thereby
limiting its practical value. If uncertainty is mitigable, why not pursue an uncertainty mitigation
strategy that facilitates prediction and causal planning? At what point does uncertainty become too
strong for such a causal approach (see Ansoff, 1991)?
This criticism is underscored by an “implicit assumption . . . that the context does not remain uncertain over time” because “an experimental
learning process—like effectuation—is expected to
reduce ambiguity, over time, through actions taken”
(Arend et al., 2015: 633). Indeed, Sarasvathy (2001)
has suggested that effectual logic can and ought to
give way to causal logic over time, as the radical
uncertainty that entrepreneurs face resolves into
more predictable Knightian risk (Perry et al., 2012).
This assumption, of course, is strained by our recognition of aleatory uncertainty.
Furthermore, proponents of effectuation theory
hold that effectuation is generally preferable to
causal approaches within conditions of uncertainty
(Read, Song, & Smit, 2009). However, absent a more
nuanced concept of uncertainty, grounding for such
a position is tenuous theoretically and unavailing
practically. For example, Reymen and colleagues
(2015) found that ventures tend to employ both
causal and effectual logics throughout the new venture development process, and suggest that such a
combinatory judgment model may be ideal. Similarly, Packard et al. (2017) argued that entrepreneurs
shift between causal and effectual logics according
to the nature of the judgment and type of uncertainty that is perceived. Thus, it is not clear that effectual judgment logic is always and necessarily
preferable under all conditions of uncertainty. Under conditions of epistemic uncertainty, for example, it may be possible and even prudent to
purposively mitigate uncertainty toward a predictive strategy, especially if the perceived costs of uncertainty mitigation are low. Thus, as Arend et al.
(2015) and Welter et al. (2016) have suggested, the
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risk–uncertainty boundary, the prevailing boundary
between predictive versus nonpredictive strategies (Sarasvathy, 2001; Wiltbank et al., 2006), is
unsatisfactory.
Here, we propose the epistemic–aleatory distinction to be a preferable theoretical boundary to explain a normative preference for predictive versus
nonpredictive strategic logics (see Figure 4). This is
not the only boundary condition—epistemic uncertainty does not necessarily imply predictive strategy,
nor does aleatory uncertainty always imply a nonpredictive strategy. For example, the costs associated
with acquiring new information also play a key role.
However, the epistemic–aleatory boundary is theoretically primary, and is, thus, our starting point.
Election of Predictive versus
Nonpredictive Strategy
Uncertainty is broadly understood to be the primary determinant of a firm’s strategic decision
logic, at least in a normative sense. Wiltbank and
colleagues (2006) distinguished three types of uncertainty: the known, the unknown, and the unknowable. Known uncertainty, or Knightian risk, is
generally manageable through predictive strategy.
The other two types correspond to our depictions of
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty, respectively.
Under unknown or epistemic uncertainty, “it is in
principle always possible to make predictions (even
if it takes time to learn how to do it well), and use
prediction as a means of controlling outcomes”
(Wiltbank et al., 2006: 988). But, in unknowable or
FIGURE 4
The Normative Determination of Strategic Logics
Costs of
Information
–

+
Epistemic
Uncertainty

+

Predictive
(Causal) Logics

+

Nonpredictive
(Effectual) Logics

–
–
Aleatory
Uncertainty
–

+

Risk of Loss
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aleatory uncertainty, it may be preferable to adapt
to and shape changing environments and its outcomes rather than attempting to predict outcomes
(Sarasvathy, 2001).
We expound, first, on the aleatory uncertainty condition. Again, a decision is characterized by aleatory
uncertainty inasmuch as and to the extent that other
human actors have influence over the outcome. While
some (e.g., Wiltbank et al., 2006: 988) have suggested
that unknowable outcomes are characterized by “true
unpredictability,” we note that attempts to predict
aleatorically uncertain outcomes are possible. Per
Lachmann (1976: 55), “The future is to all of us unknowable, though not unimaginable.” The human
mind is capable of imagining possibilities, and, from
them, forming expectations, even for and within indeterminate circumstances (Byrne, 2005; Nanay, 2016;
Shackle, 1949, 1969). One can even be quite confident
in one’s predictions under such circumstances. For
example, while human behavior might be inherently
indeterminate, one can become reasonably confident,
in spite of this indeterminacy, that actors will behave in
a certain way, due to, for example, previously demonstrated preferences and established tastes.
However, while the notion of prediction is compatible with aleatory uncertainty, Hult, Morgeson,
Morgan, Mithas, and Fornell (2017) reminded us that
what managers think people want is often wrong,
and consumers often do not know what they themselves will want (see Witt, 2001). Because outcomes
are unknowable ex ante within aleatory uncertainty,
managers typically cannot afford to bet on a single
expected outcome, and should thus prefer nonpredictive strategies.
An exception to this normative rule is the case of
low risk of loss (i.e., the resources at risk are relatively few and low value). Here, we do not mean
“risk” in the Knightian sense, but in the investment
sense of how much one stands to lose. Where risk is
low, the value of nonpredictive strategy’s lesser
chance of error is attenuated. Thus, the cost–benefit
calculus is altered, and the comparatively higher
costs of effectual strategy may not be warranted. In
aleatory uncertainty, then, nonpredictive strategy is
generally preferable, but this normative preference is
weakened or inverted under conditions of comparatively low risk of loss (see Figure 4).
Proposition 3a. Managers and entrepreneurs facing
aleatory uncertainty will tend toward nonpredictive
(effectual) logics.
Proposition 3b. The normative preference for nonpredictive (effectual) logics under conditions of aleatory

2020

Packard and Clark

uncertainty is moderated by the risk of loss such that a
low risk of loss diminishes the downside of prediction and, thus, increases the desirability of predictive
(causal) logics relative to nonpredictive (effectual)
logics.

Within conditions of epistemic uncertainty, the
choice between predictive and nonpredictive strategy hangs principally on the costs of uncertainty
mitigation relative to the benefits of prediction. The
risk of loss, the costs of information gathering, and
predictive calculation are also relevant to the cost–
benefit calculus within aleatory uncertainty; however, in the interest of space, to avoid repetitiveness,
and to emphasize where risk of loss and cost–benefit
concepts might be most prominent, we limit our
discussion to cost–benefit logic. While successful
prediction tends to produce superior performance
outcomes (Brinckmann et al., 2010), the costs of accurate prediction can vary depending on the nature
and complexity of the uncertainty. Under comparatively strong epistemic uncertainty, firms may still
elect prediction by striking a satisfactory balance
between the costs of information acquisition and
risks of error, according to the manager’s risk tolerance. For example, in something of a predictive or
causal version of the more moderate effectual
models, Chwolka and Raith (2012) provided a decision tree that accounted for the value and costs of
planning relative to the remaining uncertainty at
various stages of the firm’s development.
In general, managers and entrepreneurs facing epistemic uncertainty should, normatively, tend toward
causal logics, but this relationship is moderated by the
costs of acquiring and using information, given the
technologies of the day (see Figure 4). Some information may be prohibitively costly, time consuming, or
even impossible, given state-of-the-art limitations. For
example, in a 2016 letter to shareholders, Amazon CEO
Jeff Bezos remarked that “most decisions should
probably be made with somewhere around 70% of the
information you wish you had. If you wait for 90%, in
most cases, you’re probably being slow.” The risk of
error increases correspondingly with increases in key
information deficits. Where the risk of error outweighs
the benefits of prediction, a nonpredictive approach
may be preferable within epistemic uncertainty.
Proposition 4a. Managers and entrepreneurs facing
epistemic uncertainty will tend toward predictive
(causal) logics.
Proposition 4b. The normative preference for predictive (causal) logics under conditions of epistemic
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uncertainty is moderated by the costs of information
such that high costs of obtaining and utilizing information predictively increases the downside of prediction and, thus, decreases the desirability of
predictive (causal) logics relative to nonpredictive
(effectual) logics.

The Disaggregation of Uncertainties
A key consideration is that most decision
contexts—especially in business—are not comprised
of a single uncertainty, but of many uncertainties.
These various uncertainties generally include both
epistemic and aleatory uncertainties from various
possible factors (see Figure 3). This multiplicity of
uncertainties complicates the selection of decision
logics greatly. For, while some uncertainties may be
mitigated, other uncertainties cannot, and it becomes
far less straightforward whether and to what extent
predictive versus nonpredictive logics would be more
or less successful. The choice in decision logics, then,
is rarely a simple, single, discrete choice, but tends to
be a complex and dynamic process involving multiple
choices.
As a simple rule of thumb, nonpredictive logics
should prevail where the immitigable uncertainties
are more consequential—where the costs of error
are higher—in aggregate than the mitigable uncertainties; predictive logics should be preferred otherwise. Such consequence, however, is not always
clear or determinate. Uncertainty’s immitigability,
practically speaking, includes both aleatory uncertainties as well as those epistemic uncertainties that
are beyond the human and technological capabilities
that can feasibly be employed to the task of mitigation. Although such technological capabilities may
be developed in the process of uncertainty mitigation, doing so can often be prohibitively costly and
even itself uncertain. In all, this rule of thumb implies often-complex cost–benefit analyses of uncertainty reduction. Yet, standard cost–benefit analyses
of risk management tend to be simplistic, treating all
uncertainties as epistemic, and could be improved
by a more nuanced understanding of mitigability.
Of particular note, epistemic uncertainty’s practical mitigability depends on various factors, including the observational and computative capacities,
both human and technological, that can be committed to such mitigation. Such capacities are both
evolutionary and dynamic. They are “evolutionary”
because cognitive skills are, in part, learnable, and
human capacities to observe and calculate can develop over time. Furthermore, observational and
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computative technologies are progressive, with
information-collection and processing capabilities
expanding at an exponential rate (Wiggins & Ruefli,
2005). These capacities are also “dynamic” because
firms’ resources, and their ability to commit those
resources to such observational and computative
tasks, can quickly shift with performance outcomes
and strategic change. Thus, the practical mitigability
of epistemic uncertainty, as might be determined as a
cost–benefit ratio, shifts dynamically over time.
Correspondingly, a dynamic approach to judgment
of decision logics tends to be preferable to a discrete
choice approach in the face of multiple uncertainties
(Packard et al., 2017).
A Dynamic Approach
We subscribe to the general view that both logics
should be employed over time in a dynamic synthesis of both logics (Brinckmann et al., 2010;
Chwolka & Raith, 2012; Packard et al., 2017; Reymen
et al., 2015). However, while this literature validates
the need of such a balanced and dynamic approach,
it offers limited guidance as to when to shift logics.
For example, Reymen et al. (2015) noted that such
shifts can—and perhaps ought—to occur with
changes in the firm’s scope of activities, but their
qualitative exploration provided limited insight as to
when or why such a change in scope should lead to
such a shift.
Our delineation of uncertainty types, and the
framework depicted in Figure 4, offer important nuance and clarity to this process. Over time, particular
uncertainties become resolved and new uncertainties
arise as actions and their consequences play out, actors and other factors leave the scope of the decision or
newly come into play, new knowledge and technologies arise, etc., shifting the balance between epistemic
and aleatory uncertainties. These shifts derive from
both intrinsic (to the actor) changes (e.g., learning, new
observational or computative skills, etc.) and extrinsic
changes (e.g., technological change, changes in population, etc.). For example, Reymen et al. (2015) argued that a widening of the scope of the firm—an
intrinsically sourced change—ought to lend to a shift
toward nonpredictive logics. The theoretical mechanisms underlying such a shift can be found in the
corresponding increase in aleatory uncertainty, as
more and different actors become relevant to the firm’s
success.
Interestingly, it is typically understood that effectual logic is more apropos earlier in the entrepreneurial process, where uncertainty (both epistemic
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and aleatory) is especially high, and that the entrepreneur ought to “transition to causal strategies as
the new firm and market emerge out of uncertainty
into a more predictable situation” (Perry et al., 2012:
838). However, our framework suggests a more nuanced and complex understanding of this process.
Specifically, entrepreneurial judgment comprises
multiple judgments over multiple processes in the
face of multiple, distinct uncertainties, involving
both epistemic and aleatory sources. Only the epistemic uncertainties dissipate over time; aleatory
uncertainties do not. For example, general preferences and tastes (i.e., what I usually like) are epistemic and knowable, while immediate, time- and
context-dependent preferences (i.e., what I want at
a certain moment) are aleatory and cannot ever be
perfectly predictable. The entrepreneur may predict
aleatory uncertainties based on the information
available, but those predictions can always be
wrong, no matter how often they are right.
In all, managers and entrepreneurs typically face
multiple uncertainties of both types, epistemic and
aleatory, and of varying magnitudes and relevancies.
Managing these uncertainties does not entail a single
judgment or decision strategy, but multiple and simultaneous ongoing strategies as they attempt to
mitigate and manage the various types of uncertainty
as they come and go. Strategic management, then, is
an endless process of uncertainty management.
Successful management can be bolstered by a
superior understanding of the nature of the uncertainties one faces, and the decision strategies that
best align with them, to facilitate effective strategic
dynamism while avoiding erraticism (Robert
Mitchell, Shepherd, & Sharfman, 2011).
Proposition 5a. Managers and entrepreneurs will
(normatively) shift toward predictive (causal) decision logics over time as intrinsic or extrinsic changes
to the decision context increase the mitigability of
uncertainty.
Proposition 5b. Managers and entrepreneurs will
(normatively) shift toward nonpredictive (effectual)
decision logics over time as intrinsic or extrinsic
changes to the decision context decrease the mitigability of uncertainty.

Additional Factors
Scholars have found other factors to also be relevant to the determination of strategic decision logics.
For example, personality, motivation, cognitive
style, social influences, and a general proclivity for
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improvisation all account for a tendency toward
nonpredictive activities (Hmieleski & Corbett,
2006). Culture, such as uncertainty avoidance,
may play a role, and the benefits of planning tend to
be stronger over time as firms become more established (Brinckmann et al., 2010). The scope of the
firm’s or venture’s activities may be a factor in
managers’ choices of decision-making logics, with
this range affected by perceptions of uncertainty,
resource constraints, and stakeholder influences
(Reymen et al., 2015).
Recognizing that there may be various other factors that can influence the determination of strategic
logics that we have not here acknowledged, we hold
that such factors would be nonnormative, biasing the
decision. From a strictly normative perspective, the
choice in strategic logics should be based wholly in
the cost–benefit analysis of uncertainty mitigation.
However, the imprecision of such analyses tends to
leave a lot of room for subjective and often emotional
reasons to enter the decision, which ought to be (and
have been) the focus of additional study.
In all, the epistemic–aleatory distinction provides
important nuance and explanation to the debate between predictive and nonpredictive approaches to
strategic decision-making, and provides a superior
boundary condition, or the foundations for one, toward more complete and robust strategic management theory.
CONCLUSIONS
Returning to our original question, when should
managers and entrepreneurs forecast and plan, and
when should they adopt a more dynamic, adaptive
strategy? While answers to this question will certainly vary subjectively, we think the core of the
riddle lies within the nature of uncertainty that the
actor faces. As we look more closely into the predictability of future states, and the mitigability of that
unpredictability, we find that the nature of uncertainty hinges on deep and unresolved philosophical
questions regarding human nature and the existence
of free will. Our attempt, here, at a dispassionate
reading of the free will debate has led us to conclude
that the default position of science ought to be
voluntarism—the scientific acceptance of (or failure
to reject) free will as an original source of change in
the causal chain of events.
The acceptance of the voluntarist position implies
a consequential revision to how we understand uncertainty: all choices originating within the conscious will are rendered a priori unknowable. It
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implies true aleatory uncertainty, immitigable even
in principle. Such uncertainty is, or may be, predictable (i.e., able to be predicted), but never
perfectly. Accepting the immitigability of humansourced uncertainty offers important insight into our
question of the normative boundary between predictive and nonpredictive strategies, a point of some
contention (e.g., Arend et al., 2015; Welter et al.,
2016). Specifically, to the extent that uncertainty can
be mitigated (i.e., epistemic in nature), mitigative
strategies may be apropos, depending on the costs of
such mitigation. However, when facing aleatory
uncertainty, such mitigation strategies are futile, and
an adaptive strategy will tend to be (or, perhaps,
ought to be) preferred.
Importantly, we should consider that the uncertainty
that managers face is predominantly aleatory rather
than epistemic—the uncertainties that they must
manage primarily concern human agents: consumers,
investors, employees, and other stakeholders. This observation casts into question decades of prior research
on strategic decision-making and the normative foundations of modern behavioral science. While these
game theoretic foundations may continue to prove
useful, we question their generalizability to a world
full of aleatory uncertainty (see also Berg & Gigerenzer,
2010; Felin, Koenderink, & Krueger, 2017). A more
fundamental shift toward a voluntaristic subjectivism
in behavioral science may be required to capture and
portray the actual decision processes that actors in fact
employ in making real-world judgments.
Such a “voluntarist turn” would imply a rather
radical shift for the broader management domain.
Certainly, many of management’s core theories are
already consistent with a voluntarist position: selfdetermination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2004), goalsetting theory (Kasser & Sheldon, 2004), social
cognition theory (Bandura, 2008), and others. That
human intentions are uncaused is implicit in social
psychological theories of self-regulation as well as
subjectivist notions of beliefs, goals, and expectations (Bandura, 2008; Kihlstrom, 2008; Mises, 1998).
However, we advocate a stronger and more complete
voluntarist turn, which would, perhaps, land us in
the meta-theoretical realm of interpretivism (Burrell
& Morgan, 1979), which has gained some traction
already in management (e.g., Chia, 1995; Packard,
2017). Such a turn would require much greater
modesty within our science, especially as it pertains
to the precision and power of our theories, as it implies that human behavior is not ever fully caused or
predictable (see Bergh, Sharp, Aguinis, & Li, 2017;
Open Science Collaboration, 2015).
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The implications for management theory of
adopting the voluntarist position and its resultant
aleatory uncertainty are broad, and include changes
to theories and to their predictions or recommendations in consequence of the assumption of human
actors as a source of irreducible uncertainty due to
free will. Let us illustrate this point with an exemplar: rational choice theory. We could have chosen
any number of examples, such as entrepreneurship
(Shane, 2003), organizational behavior and job satisfaction (Judge, Parker, Colbert, Heller, & Ilies,
2001), allocation of ownership control in corporations and start-ups (Alvarez & Parker, 2009), causal
ambiguity in preventing imitation of valuable and
rare resources (Barney, 1991), the effectiveness of
exploration and ambidextrous behaviors (Mom,
Fourné, & Jansen, 2015), and many others. More
generally, any theory featuring direct A→B effects
with uncertainty as an antecedent, and theories
where uncertainty is a moderator of A→B relationships, is a candidate for careful reconsideration.
Rational choice theory is an obvious candidate as it
models decisions as being shaped by contextual
factors, but only to the extent that they shape the
perception of the choice between options. This
choice is a maximization of (subjective) utility
(Savage, 1954). Specifically, choice is traditionally
modeled (in theory) by direct effects, determined by
various internal and external factors (see Figure 1). A
voluntarist approach reconceptualizes choice as a
moderated model (see Figure 2) wherein, although
various factors influence choice, those factors, individually or collectively, do not fully determine the
choice. Instead, contextual factors may influence
behavior to a greater or lesser extent, depending on
the valence and potency of the actor’s will to choose.
Rational choice theory’s predictions would also,
as a result of this voluntarist shift, necessarily be revised. Rational choice theory predicts, generally,
that individuals will, in choice situations, attempt to
maximize their utility. Prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), however, observes that, in many cases, actors act “irrationally,” electing suboptimal options. It extends
rational choice theory by extending behavioral prediction even into apparently irrational (inefficient)
choices by exposing the consistent use of heuristics
and other biases and effects, with the stated goal of
mitigating them (Ariely, 2009; Kahneman, 2011;
Schwartz, 2004). Voluntarism, however, revises this
understanding of heuristics, noting that they are
useful and intentional in directing behavior within
conditions of uncertainty, such as first-time or novel
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contexts. For example, Maitland and Sammartino
(2015) found that, under conditions of high uncertainty, heuristic-based judgment outperformed
rational decision models centered on outcome optimization. Harrison (1977) found that managers recognized rational choice theory to be overly simplistic
and ill representative of the (aleatory) uncertainty
that they faced. Human agency makes all contexts
involving human actors novel or “first-time” in a
strict sense. Whereas actors use past experience as a
guide for present action, it is common and even
sensible to expect identical action in the face of apparently identical circumstances. Yet, as Lachmann
(1977: 92) astutely observed, “As soon as we permit time to elapse, we must permit knowledge to
change.” With people, there can never be truly identical circumstances, for time must have necessarily
elapsed and the actor has learned. The implication is
that rational choice theory mistakenly ascribes low
uncertainty to contexts involving human actors in familiar decision contexts, thus undervaluing effectual
and heuristic decision-making. Specifically, proper
attribution of conscious agents as a source of aleatory
uncertainty may, at times, switch the theory-driven
recommendation from employing an optimization
model to an adaptation model.
Rational choice theory is merely a single case in
which changes to theory and its predictions or recommendations flow from the assumption of free will.
Generally, this assumption pushes us to treat human
subjects as actors and not just another link in the
inevitable causal chain. Questions and arguments
surrounding this assumption are not new to us. They
have been widely discussed in philosophy and philosophy of science (e.g., Dilthey, 1989; Popper, 2000;
Searle, 1983; van Inwagen, 2008), psychology and
neuroscience (Baer et al., 2008; Nahmias, 2014;
Searle, 2015; Shariff, Schooler, & Vohs, 2008;
Wegner, 2003), and within the field of management
itself (Child, 1972, 1997; Heugens & Lander, 2009).
Contributing to this discussion, we have argued that
the proper “default” position for science is voluntarism and not determinism. From this, we have contributed to the uncertainty literature in showing that
human-caused uncertainty is, from a voluntarist
position, immitigable and aleatory in nature, yet it
has commonly been understood as epistemic and
mitigable. Building further from this insight, we have
shed light on an ongoing question regarding the
boundaries of strategic choice between various decision logics, which we have delineated here as
predictive (causal) and nonpredictive (effectual) (see
also Wiltbank et al., 2006).
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When should managers and entrepreneurs plan,
and when should they adopt a more adaptive strategy? The voluntarist turn that we advocate implies a
far greater place in management theory, perhaps a
predominant one, for nonpredictive and adaptive
approaches to decision-making. In the end, however,
it seems we must leave the answer to this riddle for
managers to decide.
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